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The Audacity of Protecting Racist Speech under
the National Labor Relations Act
Michael Z. Green t

ABSTRACT
Imagine two employees in the private sector workplace are discussing the possibility of selecting a union to represent their interests regarding wages and working
conditions. During this conversation, a black employee notes the importance of using theircollective voices to improve working conditions and compares the activity
of selecting a union with the Black Lives Matter protests aimed at addressingthe
killings of black men in a number of high-profile incidents within the last couple
of years. The other employee, a white male, responds by telling the black employee
that "nothing will be gained from mentioning Black Lives Matter in this union
organizing campaign. Black Lives Matter just represents a crusade to address
what happened to a bunch of N-word criminals who got what they deserved. All
lives matter." The white male employee also stated "they need to stop being distracted by issues of race and focus on the only division that matters in the workplace: class."
One might be surprisedto learn that the white male's statement could arguably be
protected under the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA). The National Labor
Relations Board (NLRB), the agency charged with enforcing the NLRA, has recently held that employees engaged in concerted activity on a picket line may utter
racialepithets at black workers with impunity. Additionally, the NLRB has a long
history of allowing employees engaged in concerted activity to respond to their supervisors with vile and disgusting language that arguably includes the use of racial epithets. Further, the NLRB places the burden on the employer to show that
utterances of racialepithets in the workplace would clearly result in the same disciplinary action taken absent any concerted activity associated with the communications. The question of whether offensive and racist statements should be protected under the NLRA, when uttered by employees arguablyengaged in concerted
activity, raisesa problem that has not yet been adequatelyaddressed by the NLRB.
This Article asserts that in its decisions protecting employee use of racist speech
while engaged in concerted activity, the NLRB has failed to considerthe important
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operationaland legal concerns that employers face in attempting to prevent harassment in the workplace based on race, a requirement under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964. Incidents of racism being highlighted nationally by the Black
Lives Matter movement make this an important time for the NLRB, a federal
agency concerned about workplace rights, to not send such a strong message that
employees may utter racial epithets without any consequences. Further, these
NLRB decisions send a broader, wrongful and even retaliatorymessage to black
employees concerned about the use of racialepithets in the workplace: that nothing
will happen if black employees protest this disruptive and offensive activity. This
Article will review the importantNLRB decisions regardingwhat is referred to as
the audacity of protecting racist workplace speech under the NLRA. The Article
will suggest an analyticalchange to how the NLRB should balance protection of
concerted activity under the NLRA with the disruptive workplace activity of uttering racial epithets. The proposed change suggests an analytical framework that
does not deter black employee protest of this disruptive behavior and accommodates Title VI's broad retaliationanalysis.

I.

INTRODUCTION: LEGAL PROTECTIONS FOR RACIST SPEECH UNDER
THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT IN A BLACK LIVES
MATTER CLIMATE

It should be no surprise that an employee's utterance of racist
speech in the workplace, especially the use of the N-word,1 could subject
that employee to disciplinary action. 2 Harvard law professor, Randall
Kennedy, has explained the significance of uttering this word:
Any person in the United States should be aware of the N-word.
Ignorance could be very costly. Failing to recognize it as the signal of danger that it often is could well lead to injury, just as
using it unaware of its effects and consequences could well cost
a person his reputation, his job, or even his life.3
As a result, one might clearly expect that an employee who uses the Nword or any other form of racist speech in the workplace would be placing his job in jeopardy.

' Although some believe that it is important to use the actual word to represent its impact, I
have specifically chosen to not use the actual word if not necessary and believe that any reader
can easily determine the actual word through the use of the euphemism, N-word. As a result, the
only point in this Article where you will see the actual word used is when it is being quoted directly
from a source or in the title of a citation.
2 See Leora F. Eisenstadt, The N-Word at Work: Contextualizing Language in the Workplace,
33 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 299, 306-10 (2012) (describing several incidents where celebrities
and "average citizens" were all disciplined by their employers for uttering racist and offensive
epithets due to public outrage and related concerns of the employer).
3 See Randall Kennedy, The David C. Baum Lecture: "Nigger!"as a Problem in the Law, 2001
U. ILL. L. REV. 935, 937 (2001).
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Nevertheless, one might be surprised to find that some employees
have resisted an employer's disciplinary action for uttering racist statements in the workplace 4 by asserting that their derogatory statements
constituted protected activity under the National Labor Relations Act
(NLRA or the Act). 5 Decisions by the National Labor Relations Board
(NLRB or the Board), the federal agency which enforces the NLRA,
have shielded employees from employer discipline despite the utterance
of racial epithets. 6
Concerns about race relations in our society have become more
prominent through the development of the Black Lives Matter movement.7 By providing a unique social media vehicle for national protest

4 See infra Section II (discussing cases). This rights-based argument, while based on the
NLRA and its statutory workplace rights, has broader implications when considering other legal
arguments supporting rights-based protections to utter racist speech in the workplace, including
claims under the First Amendment and contractual agreements to protect speech as part of academic freedom. Although beyond the scope of this Article, which is limited to the NLRA, and while
also recognizing there are important policy reasons to protect even racist speech related to rights
under these legal doctrines, these speech-based rights should be balanced with an employer's concern with providing efficiency and productivity because employees have to work together and
should not be subjected to incivility and bullying that hamper efficiency in the workplace. See, e.g.,
Pickering v. Bd. of Educ. of Twp. High Sch. Dist. 205, Will Cty., Ill., 391 U.S. 563, 567-68 (1968)
(referring to how the First Amendment protects public employee speech on matters of public concern but also allows for balancing the government's interest "as an employer, in promoting the
efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees"); Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S.
138, 146-47 (1983) (discussing the public concern requirement and balancing it with the need for
an employer to provide effective services). Even more importantly, and as highlighted herein, employers must be allowed to respond to racist utterances in the workplace to circumvent liability to
black employees who are harmed by those statements as harassment; however, if these rightsbased arguments are allowed to prevail, they can have the pernicious effect of creating a retaliatory environment for black employees who are deterred from protesting racist workplace speech.
See infra Section III.
' See Pub. L. No. 74-198, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§151-69
(2012)).
6 See, e.g., Ozburn-Hessey Logistics, LLC, 359 N.L.R.B. 1025, 1026 (May 2, 2013) (agreeing
with the administrative law judge's decision that disciplinary action against a union supporter for
the alleged use of the N-word in referring to an employee opposed to the union constituted use of
the "anti-harassment policy to target union supporters" as pretext so that even if the employer
"reasonably believed that [the employee] had used a racial epithet, [the Board] would find that the
[employer] could not and did not establish that it would have disciplined her in the absence of
union activity"), vacated on other grounds, Ozburn-Hessey Logistics, 200 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1400
(N.L.R.B. 2014), 2014 WL 2929772 (N.L.R.B. June 27, 2014).
See Charles R. Lawrence III, The Fire This Time: Black Lives Matter, Abolitionist Pedagogy
and the Law, 65 J. LEGAL EDUC. 381, 386 n.15 (2015) ('Black Lives Matter' was first coined by two
black women, Alicia Garza and Patrisse Cullors, in response to George Zimmerman's being found
not guilty in the killing of Trayvon Martin." (citing Nishat Kurwa, 'Black Lives Matter' Slogan
Becomes a Bigger Movement, NPR (Dec. 4, 2014), http://www.npr.org/2014/12/04/368408247/blacklives-matter-slogan-becomes-a-bigger-movement [https://perma.cc/M8V6-YCF5])); Nicole D. Porter, ExpandingPublic Safety in the Eraof Black Lives Matter, 70 MIAMI L. REV. 533, 535 n.3 (2016)
("Black Lives Matter is a social justice movement and social media framework (#BlackLivesMatter), founded in the United States that started after the July 2013 acquittal of George Zimmerman
in the shooting death of Florida teenager Trayvon Martin. The movement was further animated
by the 2014 shooting of Michael Brown in Ferguson, Missouri. The social justice organizers who
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through the discussion of several examples of how our society has
reached a boiling point on matters of race, the Black Lives Matter movement has placed a public spotlight on racial insensitivity and also fostered a broad discussion with respect to when racist speech may be regulated versus when it may be protected in the employment setting.8
Before the Black Lives Matter movement started in response to recent
killings of black men in Ferguson, Missouri; Charleston, South Carolina; New York, New York; and Baltimore, Maryland within the past
few years, 9 employees had made racist statements while also asserting
their legally protected right to comment. 10 However, several examples
conceived the term, Black Lives Matter, have asserted that it reinforces that African American
lives, often viewed without value, are important."). The Black Lives Matter movement website
states that this movement was created "after Trayvon Martin's murderer, George Zimmerman,
was acquitted for his crime, and dead 17-year old Trayvon was posthumously placed on trial for
his own murder." About the Black Lives Matter Network, BLACK LIVEs MATTER, http:/fblack
livesmatter.comlabout/ [https://perma.cc/6N7S-Z67A].
" See Khanh Ho, Microaggressionsin the Workplace: Black Lives Matter and Politically Correct Speech, HUFFPOST (October 8, 2016), http://www.hufflngtonpost.com/khanh-ho/microaggres
sions-in-the-w b_8265564.html [https://perma.ccl6369-MF2Y] (describing how most black persons
feel uncomfortable protesting racism in the workplace until they have nothing left to lose as evidenced with the Black Lives Matter Movement and how debates have ensued about whether the
response that All Lives Matter represents a racist statement because of the growing backlash to
the Black Lives Matter movement); see also Jessica Guynn, ZuckerbergReprimandsFacebookStaff
Defacing 'Black Lives Matter, USA TODAY (Feb. 25, 2016), http://www.usatoday.com/story/
tech/news/2016/02/25/facebook-mark-zuckerberg-black-lives-matter-diversity/80933694/
[https://
perma.cc/MC5S-ATQN] (describing how Facebook CEO Mark Zuckerberg responded forcefully after employees crossed out Black Lives Matter and wrote All Lives Matter on the walls of the company's campus by launching an investigation and stating that those communications represent a
"deeply hurtful and tiresome experience for the black community" and the comments were "unacceptable" to him and how he was "very disappointed by this disrespectful behavior").
9 See Lydia Polgreen, From Ferguson to Charlestonand Beyond, Anguish About Race Keeps
Building, N.Y. TIMES (June 20, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/21/us/from-ferguson-tocharleston-and-beyond-anguish-about-race-keeps-building.html
[https://perma.cc/9ANG-JVNHI
(cataloguing common concepts involved with several incidents where an unarmed black male was
killed by police in the cities of Ferguson, Missouri; Baltimore, Maryland; Staten Island, New York;
North Charleston, South Carolina; and Cleveland, Ohio, as well as the rough handling of black
teenagers at a pool party by a police officer in McKinney, Texas, while also referring to a Black
Lives Matter march in Charleston, South Carolina as a response to a white male entering a historically black church and killing nine black parishioners); see also Jelani Cobb, The Matter of
Black Lives, NEW YORKER (Mar. 14, 2016), http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2016/03/14/
where-is-black-lives-matter-headed [https://perma.cc/82GM-8F8D] (referring to "flash points" in
the Black Lives Matter movement as the trial of George Zimmerman for killing Trayvon Martin,
the shooting of Michael Brown in Ferguson, Missouri, and the massacre of black parishioners at
Emanuel African Methodist Episcopal Church in Charleston, South Carolina, all occurring during
the second term of President Barack Obama).
'0 See Greer v. City of Warren, 2012 WL 1014658, at *7 (W.D. Ark. Mar. 23, 2012) (finding
that an employee's display of a Confederate flag on MySpace, a social media website, and at home
was protected First Amendment speech); Dixon v. Coburg Dairy, Inc., 330 F.3d 250, 263-64 (2003)
(finding that First Amendment protections were implicated where an employee refused to remove
two Confederate flags from his tool box after a black co-worker complained, but that the employee's
insistence on keeping the tool box with the Confederate flags rather than getting a new tool box
without the flags was not protected), vacated on other grounds, 369 F.3d 811 (4th Cir. 2005). Cf
Pappas v. Giuliani, 290 F.3d 143, 155-56 (2d Cir. 2003) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (finding that
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have emerged where negative and even racist comments about the
Black Lives Matter movement by employees have started to spark public debate about an employer's response to those statements when challenged.1 1 Any efforts aimed at protecting racist speech in the workplace
chills all forms of black worker protest whether made pursuant to the
Black Lives Matter movement or for some other reason.
Furthermore, the Black Lives Matter movement has encouraged
black workers to become more vocal in protesting racial conditions and
employers have been faced with challenging questions about how to respond to these protests. 12 Probably the most recent and prominent debate regarding black employee protest about racist behavior stems from
the acts of National Football League (NFL) player, Colin Kaepernick,
who has responded to treatment of black individuals in our society by
the police, the same concerns of the Black Lives Matter movement,
through kneeling during the playing of the National Anthem during
NFL games.' 3 Kaepernick has been "lauded ... and equally vilified" by

racist speech by a white supremacist police officer was protected by the First Amendment as it
involved "an employee speaking on issues of race relations entirely unrelated to his job"). However,
the assertion of some legal right to utter a racially offensive statement does not guarantee that the
employee will be protected from disciplinary action. See, e.g., Dambrot v. Cent. Mich. Univ., 55
F.3d 1177, 1187 (6th Cir. 1995) (holding that a basketball coach's use of the N-word when speaking
to the team was not protected because it was not a matter of public concern as it did not relate to
matters of "political, social, or other concern to the community"); Pereira v. Comm'r of Soc. Services, 733 N.E.2d 112, 119 (Mass. 2000) (finding that an employee dismissed for making a racist
joke had not uttered speech on a matter of public concern).
" See, e.g., Sam Wood, Jefferson Health Fires Employee over Racist Facebook Post, PHIL.
INQUIRER (July 15, 2016), http://www.philly.com/philly/healthl20160715_AracistFacebook-po
stleads_to firingofdJefferson-employee.html [https://perma.ccfW5LU-66ZZ] (describing the termination of a hospital worker for posting racist comments on Facebook about Black Lives Matter
protesters and describing terminations of other employees including police officers, fire fighters,
and a corrections officer for making racist statements on Facebook about the Black Lives Matter
movement); see also Dougal Ernst, Black Lives Matter Critic HarassedforSaying All Lives Matter',
WND (Nov. 20, 2015), http://www.wnd.com/2015/1 1/black-lives-matter-critic-fired-for-saying-alllives-matter/ [https://perma.ccl7EZ3-4WBP] (discussing a female's Facebook post arguing that "All
Lives Matter" in response to Black Lives Matter movement and how those who felt the statement
was racist responded to her and even suggested contacting her employer to protest her comments);
Jarvis DeBerry, Op-ed Critical of 'Black Lives Matter'Followed by Cowardly Apology in Student
Paper:JarvisDeBerry, NOLA.COM (Sep. 26, 2015), http://www.nola.com/opinions/index.ssf/2015/09/
wesleyan-blacklives.html [https://perma.ccXW8A-Q7YT] (describing op-ed written in the Wesleyan university student newspaper by a white male staff writer criticizing the Black Lives Matter
movement and subsequent student protests to the writer's employer charging the op-ed as being
racist along with requests seeking to stop funding for the student newspaper and other pressures
that led to the eventual and unusual response by the newspaper of issuing an apology).
" Jon Hyman, Why #BlackLivesMatter Should Matter to Employers, WORKFORCE (July 13,
2106), http://www.workforce.com/2016/07/13/why-blacklivesmatter-should-matter-to-employers/
[https://perma.cc/6CES-7VBR] (describing how the Black Lives Matter movement is fostering more
discussion of race and leading to more black worker protest to racist or discriminatory messages
that employers should be prepared to respond to without retaliation under Title VII and without
violating the concerted activity rights of black employees in protesting, a violation of the NLRA).
1 See Elliott Almond, Shades of Ali: Kaepernick Sparked New Wave of Athlete Protest,
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the public and even a Supreme Court justice for his protest while also
receiving an award voted on by his co-worker teammates for his courage.1 4 Kaepernick's situation, sparked by concerns raised by the Black
Lives Matter movement, now highlights a new reality regarding how
comfortable black employees feel about protesting matters of race in the
workplace.
This new reality offers key challenges for employers as they decide
the appropriate response to racism while seeking a productive workplace. As a result, employers need to know that they may take action
against an employee's racially derogatory statements without the limitations created by the NLRB's decision to protect racist speech. In 2015,
then-NLRB Member Harry I. Johnson discussed the growing concern
about the challenges employers face when presented with harassment
cases arising under the NLRA:
We live and work in a civilized society, or at least that is our
claimed aspiration. The challenge in the modern workplace is to
bring people of diverse beliefs, backgrounds, and cultures together to work alongside each other to accomplish shared, productive goals. Civility becomes the one common bond that can
hold us together in these circumstances. Reflecting this underlying truth, moreover, legal and ethical obligations make employers responsible for maintaining safe work environments
that are free of unlawful harassment. Given all this, employers
are entitled to expect that employees will coexist treating each
other with some minimum level of common decency.15
This Article asserts that employees who utter racist statements
should be subject to regulation by their employers regardless of whether
those statements have been uttered in a context where concerns about
protection of rights under the NLRA may also be present. 16 In this Black
MERCURY NEWS (Dec. 27, 2016), http://www.mercurynews.com/2016/12/27/2016kap/ [https://per
ma.cc/J4KQ-V8YU] (describing Kaepernick's protest).
14 Id.; see Tim Kawakami, Colin Kaepernick's Very Notable
Honor, Jed York's Very Telling
Comment and the 49ers' 2017 Housecleaning Set-Up, TALKING POINTS (Dec. 31, 2016), http://
blogs.mercurynews.com/kawakamil2016/12/31fkaepernick-baalke/ [https://perma.cclBBP7-P2JT]
(describing how Kaepernick's General Manager was wrong about criticizing Kaepernick for creating a distraction with his protest and suggesting Kaepernick should not be employed as the quarterback and leader of his team when the players resoundingly rejected this narrative by voting to
give Kaepernick the prestigious Eshmont award for his courage); see also Gene Collier, The Colin
Kaepernick Saga is Preposterous, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Aug. 13, 2017 (describing how
Kaepernick won an award voted on by his co-workers for "inspirational and courageous play" but
still cannot find a job as a quarterback because of his protest and not because of his abilities).
15 Pier Sixty, LLC, 362 N.L.R.B. No. 59, 2015 WL 1457688, at *5 (Mar. 31, 2015) (Member
Johnson, dissenting), enforced, 855 F.3d 115 (2d Cir. 2017).
1' Only the scope of the disciplinary action taken may be limited to ensure that the employer's
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Lives Matter climate where black employees have demanded more responsiveness to issues of race, employers must face the pressing desire
for civility and the overall legal and moral need to prevent and respond
to offensive statements that may create a hostile environment. As a result, employers have strong incentives to respond to racist statements
uttered in the workplace.
Some NLRB decisions have balanced the concerted activity interest
of employees with other employer interests in ensuring that other employees are free from harassment, incivility, bullying, and disparagement.17 The NLRB should clearly apply this analysis in all situations
involving racist utterances. Because some words (such as the N-word)
are inherently offensive regardless of the context in which the statement was made,18 it is essential that employers be able to address reasonable regulation of those racist utterances in a way that accommodates important efficiency values and concerns about preventing racial
harassment, while superseding policy reasons or rights-based arguments to allow employees to speak freely.
In Section II, this Article examines the scope of legal protections
regarding racist speech under the NLRA. Section II also examines the
unique perspective of the use of the N-word and other racist utterances
as a form of speech afforded some protection under the NLRA and the

actions have been consistently applied to statements of all workers and not just those who are also
asserting rights protected by the NLRA.
1 See Arielle A. Dagen-Sunsdahl, Note, Navigating Through Hills & Dales: Can Employers
Abide by the NLRA While Maintaining Civil Work Environments?, 31 ABA J. LAB. & EMP. L. 363,
378 (2016) (balancing employer civility policies with rights by the NLRA). Cf. William Beaumont
Hospital, 363 N.L.R.B. No. 162 (Apr. 3, 2016) (Member Miscimarra, concurring in part and dissenting part) (arguing that an employer's "legitimate justification" and interests in regulating certain workplace activities through policies and rules should be balanced with any potentially adverse impact on employee rights protected by the NLRA). Due to the political nature of the NLRB
and how it is generally accepted that the President may appoint three of its five members from the
President's party, there is a legitimate concern that the Board's position on issues may change
with a new Republican President after eight years with a Democratic President. See Michael Z.
Green, The NLRB as an Uberagency for the Evolving Workplace, 64 EMORY L.J. 1621, 1627 (2015)
(describing partisan nature of the appointment of NLRB members). Given the number of dissenting opinions by Republican Board members, such as Harry Johnson and the current acting chairman, Phillip Miscimarra, criticizing the Board's failure to consider an employer's obligations to
respond to harassing conduct under Title VII, the Board may soon consider changing its analytical
approach with respect to the cases discussed herein after President Trump completes his NLRB
appointments.
"s See Alexander Tsesis, The Boundaries of Free Speech, 8 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 141, 145
(2005) (reviewing the 2004 landmark publication by Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, Understanding Words that Wound, and suggesting that "[c]alling someone a 'spic,', a 'kike', or 'nigger'
floods the imagination . . . with insulting ideas about Latinos, Jews, and African Americans" and
that these terms represent '[s]tereotypes that have been communicated repeatedly in diverse social
contexts" where they "require less information to evoke a whole series of negative connotations");
see also Eisenstadt, supra note 2, at 314 (suggesting that some racist speech must be evaluated by
its context including the "time, place, identity of the parties, and tone of voice").
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rationales supporting that protection. Section III highlights the compelling policy interests that make it extremely important for employers to
be able to regulate racist speech through appropriate regulatory responses that discipline employees. Section III also establishes a framework for employers to regulate workplace speech that accommodates
both important policy reasons for allowing employees to speak freely
and important reasons for employers to take disciplinary action when
employees utter racist statements, including legal and productivity interests. That accommodating framework can balance these interests by
adopting retaliation analysis developed under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), which bans employment discrimination
based upon race, color, sex, national origin and religion.19 In Section IV,
the Article concludes that the consequences of racist speech, including
offensiveness that can eventually lead to a hostile racial environment
for black employees under Title VII, can be handled in a fair and balanced way through analytical changes under the NLRA and a focus on
broader concerns about creating an environment condoning retaliation
against black employees who want to challenge or protest racist speech.
II.

A.

BACKGROUND: NLRA RATIONALES FOR LEGAL PROTECTIONS OF
RACIST WORKPLACE SPEECH
Picket Line Comments: Clear Pines Mouldings Protects Racial
Epithets and Vulgarities If They Do Not Include Threats

Section 7 of the NLRA provides: "Employees shall have the right to
self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain
collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection . . ."20 Also, Section 8(a)(1) of the
NLRA creates an unfair labor practice that can be prosecuted by the
NLRB if an employer acts "to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in [Section 7].1"21 Section 7

19

20
2

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2a (2012).
29 U.S.C. § 157 (2012).
29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (2012).
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of the NLRA applies to "all forms of worker activism" whether in a unionized environment or in a workplace with no union, 22 while also including picketing activity. 23
In its Clear Pine Mouldings, Inc.2 4 decision, the NLRB found that
certain misconduct by striking employees on the picket line warrants
protection as concerted activity. 25 Unless their misconduct may reasonably tend to coerce or intimidate employees in the exercise of their Section 7 rights and the General Counsel proves that striking employees
were denied reinstatement for this misconduct, striking employees
should be reinstated to the positions they held prior to the strike. 26 The
Board in ClearPine Mouldings further clarified that: "we reject the per
se rule that words alone can never warrant a denial of reinstatement in
the absence of physical acts" 2 7 and "the only activity the statute privileges in this context, other than peaceful patrolling, is the nonthreatening expression of opinion, verbally or through signs and pamphleteering."28
Unfortunately, the NLRB has expanded upon Clear Pine Mouldings to find that the utterance of racial epithets by striking employees
warrants protection. 29 First, in the 2004 decision in Detroit Newspapers,30 the initial steps arose that led to the Board's expanded application of ClearPine Mouldings to cover racist comments when the administrative law judge found that racist statements by a striking employee
did not constitute threats and, as a result, the comments were protected. 31 The employee's statements in Detroit Newspapers included
saying "[y]ou fuckin' bitch, nigger lovin' whore" and "[i]t's your fault
that white America lost their jobs."3 2

22 See Catherine L. Fisk & Deborah C. Malamud, The NLRB
in Administrative Law Exile:
Problems with Its Structure and Function and Suggestions for Reform, 58 DUKE L.J. 2013, 2024
(2009) ("Section 7 could be read as providing general anti-retaliation protection for all forms of
worker activism, so long as the activism is 'concerted' and for 'mutual aid or protection."'). An
employer may not retaliate against an employee for exercising the right to engage in protected
concerted activity. Triangle Elec. Co., 335 N.L.R.B. 1037, 1038 (2001); Meyers Indus., Inc., 268
N.L.R.B. 493, 497 (1984).
23 Gerold J. Kehoe, Picket Line Misconduct: When Push Comes to Shove are Section 7 Rights
Lost in the Shuffle?, 58 TEMPLE L.Q. 921 (1985).
24 268 N.L.R.B. 1044 (1984), enforced, 765 F.2d 148 (9th Cir. 1985).
25 268 N.L.R.B. at 1062.
26 Id. at 1046.

27 id.
21 Id. at 1047.

* See, e.g., Airo Die Casting, Inc., 347 N.L.R.B 810, 811-12 (2006).
* 342 N.L.R.B. 223 (2004).
31 Id. at 268-69.
32

Id. at 268.
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In relying on prior striker misconduct decisions not involving racist
comments but involving profanity and "vile language and/or gestures,
standing alone" that did not constitute forfeiture of rights because there
was no threat, the administrative law judge in Detroit Newspapers
found: "While there is no doubt what [the employee] said . .. was clearly
offensive and reprehensible under any objective standard, it does not
constitute grounds for discharge under Clear Pine Mouldings."33 Although it appears that Detroit Newspapers was the first key case where
the use of racial epithets, not just profanity, was at issue, the Board did
not specifically address or adopt the administrative law judge's analysis
about the racial epithet being protected. The individual case, involving
the charges related to the employee making those racist statements and
the subsequent disciplinary action being challenged pertaining to that
employee, settled after the administrative law judge's decision and it
was not one of the charges considered by the Board in its final decision
in Detroit Newspapers.34
Nevertheless, the Board specifically expanded the Clear Pine
Mouldings analysis to include racial epithets and racist statements in
its 2006 decision in Airo Die Casting, Inc.3 5 In Airo Die Casting, the
Board affirmed the administrative law judge's finding that the employer committed an unfair labor practice after the judge determined
that a picketer's racial slur, "'fuck you nigger,"' standing alone, did not
constitute a threat and was protected. 36 The Airo Die Casting administrative law judge cited the Board's Detroit Newspapers decision for support despite the fact that the Board in Detroit Newspapers never
adopted the rationale of the Detroit Newspapers administrative law
judge decision regarding the application of racial epithets under Clear
Pine Mouldings.37 The administrative law judge in Airo Die Casting also
cited Nickell Moulding38 in support of the decision, which involved the
use of profanity, absent any racial epithets, and was subsequently reversed. 39
Furthermore, two out of the three members involved in the Board
decision in Airo Die Casting signaled a possible change to the Board's
analysis when considering an employee's use of racial epithets, like the

at 269.
Id. at 223-24 & n.4.
347 N.L.R.B. 810 (2006).
Id. at 812.

31Id.
34
35
3

3 Id. ("Mhe Board has found that a striker's use of the most vile and vulgar language, including racial epithets, does not deprive him of the protection of the Act, so long as those actions
do not constitute a threat.") (citing Detroit Newspapers, 242 N.L.R.B. 223 (2004)).
8 317 N.L.R.B. 826 (1995), rev'd, NMC Finishing v. NLRB, 101 F.3d 528, 530 (8th Cir. 1996).
39

101 F.3d at

530.
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N-word, under the Clear Pine Mouldings standard. Specifically, Members Schaumber and Kirsanow noted in Airo Die Casting that although
they agreed with the administrative law judge's findings in the case,
they also believed that "there may well be circumstances, absent here,
in which a picketing employee's use of the word 'nigger' might cause the
employee to lose the Act's protection, even in the absence of violence or
explicit threats of violence." 40 In considering an employee's utterance of
the N-word, Republican Board Members Schaumber and Kirsanow suggested that "under the right (or wrong) circumstances, the word itself
may be so incendiary as to constitute an implied threat or an incitement
to violence." 41
For several years, Airo Die Casting appeared to be the only Board
decision that seemed to support the protection of racist statements on
the picket line as an extension of Clear Pine Mouldings, despite its divided reasoning about racist utterances and its reliance on an administrative law decision in Detroit Newspapers as concrete precedent when
the Board never addressed the issue due to a settlement. In its most
recent decision on the subject in 2016, the NLRB has continued to expand its application of Clear Pine Mouldings to protect striker misconduct involving racist speech while ignoring broader concerns about an
employer's need to address racial harassment of its black workers.
In Cooper Tire & Rubber Co., 4 2 an NLRB administrative law judge
found that an employee's alleged racist comments while on the picket
line during a lockout constituted protected activity under the NLRA. 43
The employee, Runion, while acting as a member of a picket line, yelled
out toward black replacement workers who crossed the picket line to
enter the workplace: "Hey, did you bring enough KFC for everyone?"
and "Hey, anybody smell that? I smell fried chicken and watermelon.""
These comments were captured on videotape by one of the employer's
security guards. 45 Although the employee admitted that he made the
KFC statement, he did not agree that he made the chicken and watermelon statement. 46
The employer terminated Runion for making these statements
while on the picket line. After the termination, a grievance was filed by
Runion's union and the dispute went to an arbitrator. The arbitrator
4o 347 N.L.R.B. 810, 810 n.1 (2006).
41 id.

42 363 N.L.R.B. No. 194, 2016 WL 2894792 (May 17, 2016), enforced, 866 F.3d 885
(8th Cir.

2017)
4 Id. at *2.
44 Id.

4 Id.
46 Id.
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decided that the employee had uttered both statements and upheld the
termination as made by the employer with just cause due to the employee's serious misconduct in saying the statements and conveying the
statements in the picket line context, which could have incited violence.4 7 The union asked the Board not to defer to the arbitration decision and to consider the union's charge of an unfair labor practice. 48 The
NLRB filed an unfair labor practice complaint and alleged that while
the racist comments could be considered offensive, they were insufficient to warrant termination of the employee. 49
Specifically, the NLRB's General Counsel asserted that pursuant
to established Board precedent in Airo Die Casting50 and Detroit Newspapers,5 1 the "racially charged statements did not tend to coerce or intimidate employees in their Section 7 rights because they were not accompanied by threats or aggressive behavior." 52 The situation and the
comments in Airo Die Casting were similar to the facts in Cooper Tire;
however, the Airo Die Casting comments included even stronger racial
language as an employee on the picket line approached both cars crossing the picket line and an African American security guard and yelled
with both his middle fingers extended: .'[F]uck you nigger."' 53 In Airo
Die Casting, the Board found that the employee's activity was protected
as long as it was not a threat.5 4 The comments in Detroit Newspapers
included "racial epithets such as 'you fuckin' bitch, nigger lovin' whore,"'
which were deemed protected statements under the NLRA by the administrative law judge as long as they did not constitute threats, although the unfair labor practice charges regarding this matter were settled and not considered by the Board in its final decision.5 5
The Board in Cooper Tire affirmed the administrative law judge's
decision while also refusing to consider the administrative law judge's
discussion of DetroitNewspapers as persuasive because the Board never
considered the racist language in Detroit Newspapers.56 In the Cooper
4

Id.

4 Id.
4 Id.

" 347 NL.R.B. 810 (2006).
342 N.L.R.B. 223 (2004).
52 Cooper Tire, 363 N.L.R.B. No. 194, 2016 WL 2894792, at *2 (administrative
law judge decision describing the contentions of the parties).
5 Airo Die Casting, 347 N.L.R.B. at 811.
5 Id. at 810 n.3 (affirming administrative law judge decision finding at 347 N.L.R.B at 81112).
a Cooper Tire, 363 N.L.R.B. No. 194, 2016 WL 2894792, at *2 n.11 (administrative law decision referring to Detroit Newspapers, 342 N.L.R.B. at 223-24).
16 Id. at *1 n.1 ("Finally, in adopting the judge's findings, we do not rely on his citations to the
administrative law judge's decisions in Detroit Newspapers, 342 N.L.R.B. 223, 268-69 (2004) and
51
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Tire decision, the Board noted that it was appropriate not to defer to
the arbitrator's decision. Specifically, the arbitrator's finding conflicted
with the Board's standard in Clear Pine Mouldings by concluding the
employee's conduct was even more serious because it occurred on a
picket line. 7
What is somewhat interesting is that the Board in Cooper Tire distinguished the result from its 1955 decision, Spielberg Manufacturing
Co., 58 where four striking employees were found to have engaged in un-

protected activity on the picket line and were lawfully refused reinstatement when "they persistently shouted profane insults, including racist
slurs, at individuals over several days of picketing."59 According to the
Board in Cooper Tire, the conduct in Spielberg was "distinguishable
from the instant case on its facts." 60 This finding suggests that the
Board distinguished the two racial slurs made by Runion in Cooper Tire
from the four striking employees in Spielberg because their racial slurs
were made over a longer period of time and directly to individual employees. Also, the Board found it important that Runion's statements in
Cooper Tire were only "made about replacement workers after a closed
van carrying those workers had passed." 6 1
Here is where the Board's slavish and narrow adherence to the
Clear Pine Mouldings standard has gone awry given the realities of our
heightened Black Lives Matter climate in the workplace. The Board
tends to assume that the use of racist statements on the picket line, per
se, does not coerce employees in the exercise of their Section 7 rights.
However, as the arbitrator in Cooper Tire indicated, any African-American employee who was the object of the race-related comments made
by Runion would consider the comments "disrespectful of [their] dignity." 6 2 Also, by protecting the comments at issue and not deferring to

Wayne Stead Cadillac, 303 N.L.R.B. 432, 436 (1991), which the judge found 'persuasive' but had
not been subject to Board review.").
5 Id. ("We agree with the judge that deferral is inappropriate based on his conclusion that the
arbitrator's decision was 'clearly repugnant' to the Act, including on the ground that the arbitrator's statement that employee Anthony Runion's conduct was 'even more serious' because it oc-

curred on a picket line is contrary to the Board's standard for evaluating picket-line misconduct
under Clear Pine Mouldings, 268 NLRB 1044, 1046 (1984), enforced, 765 F2d. 148 (9th Cir. 1985),
cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1105 (1986). However, we do not rely on the parts of the judge's rationale
that can be read to find that the arbitrator failed to adequately consider the unfair labor practice
issue.").
112 N.L.R.B. 1080 (1955).
9 Cooper Tire, 363 N.L.R.B. No. 194, 2016 WL 2894792, at *1 n.1 (citing Spielberg, 112
N.L.R.B. at 1082 & n.6).
G Id.
61 Id.
62 Id. at
*2.
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the decision of the arbitrator, the Board seemed to countenance an environment where even more racist statements would transpire and
more potential for violence could occur.6 3
What the Board fails to consider in its analysis is how such racist
statements can coerce those African American employees exercising
their Section 7 rights. Would not most African-American employees feel
uncomfortable about striking workers who they may have to work side
by side with when the strike is over if those striking workers were so
readily willing to use racist statements and racial epithets while on the
picket line? By the very nature of uttering the racist speech, are not the
striking employees trying to coerce the black workers into not continuing to work with them? Otherwise, why use racist speech in the first
instance? Even if the Board has the audacity to continue finding that
racist statements made while on the picket line should be protected unless they rise to the level of a threat or coercion of Section 7 rights under
ClearPine Mouldings, the Board should, at a minimum, reconsider how
racist statements can coerce employees in the use of their Section 7
rights and should not condone racist statements under any standard
the Board uses.
Bloggers have commented about the Hobson's choice that employers may face based upon Cooper Tire.64 As long as the racist statements
are not threats and were part of activity pursued on behalf of Section 7
activity, the speech will be protected and employer disciplinary actions
would violate the NLRA. However, failing to take disciplinary action
could subject the employer to liability for racial discrimination claims.
Given that the NLRB approved the administrative law judge's findings
in Cooper Tire on May 17, 2016, it is unlikely that the current members
from the 2016 Board will change their analysis, especially since it appears to be consistent with the Board's earlier decision in Airo Die Casting.65 Russell L. Samson, a management attorney, has recommended

that employers:
63 Id. at *2 n.5 (describing how an unidentified person used the N-word on the picket line after
Runion left).
6 Thomas T. Hearn, NLRB Rules that Racism Is a ProtectedActivity, HR LEGALIST (June 24,
[https://
2015), http://www.hrlegalist.com/2015/06/nlrb-rules-that-racism-is-a-protected-activity/
perma.cc/524N-7Z7S]; Jillian Kay Melchor, The NLRB Sides with Despicably Racist Union Work-

ers over Their Employer, NATIONAL REVIEW (June 15, 2015), http://www.nationalreview.com/arti

cle/419 745/nlrb-sides-despicably-racist-union-workers-over-their-employer-jillian-kay-melchior [h
ttps://perma.ccRR9F-5ARQ]; Russell L. Samson, Title VII vs. NLRA on the Picket Line: Employers
in a Quandary, DICKINSON IOWA EMPLOYER LAW BLOG (June 25, 2015),

http://www.dickin

sonlaw.com/2015/06/title-vii-vs-nlra-picket-line-employers-quandary/ [https://perma.cclMA5U-3U
NX]; Christian Schappel, One Unbelievable NLRB Ruling: Racist Comments Protected, HR
MORNING (June 12, 2015), http://www.hrmorning.comlunbelievable-nlrb-ruling-racist-commentsprotected/ [https://perma.cclP9AY-HZ6X].
65 The employer in Cooper Tire challenged the Board's decision to the United
States Court of
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should favor the broader societal policy expressed in the general
discrimination laws as amplified by the courts: Adopt, adhere to,
and enforce a "no harassment" policy to teach bigots that "expressing their opinions in a way that abuses or offends their coworker will not be tolerated." If there is going to be an imprimatur on such conduct, let it be done by some outside entity. 66
Some courts have started to reject the NLRB's approach. In NMC
Finishingv. NLRB 67 the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit found that a female striker's display of a picket sign, "Who is
Rhonda F [with an X through the F] Sucking today?" was not protected
activity and refused to enforce the Board's decision that the activity was
protected by the Act.68 Additionally, in Media General Operations, Inc.,
d/b/a The Tampa Tribune,69 the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit reversed the Board and found that an employee lost the
Act's protection when he called the employer's vice president a "'stupid
fucking moron"' while criticizing the vice president's mailings and bargaining tactics even though the employee later apologized. 70 These
cases, while not even involving examples of hideous racist statements,
do establish that some federal courts have reversed the NLRB's expansive protection of offensive speech.
Finally and most recently, Judge Millett, of the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, wrote a concurring opinion in Consolidated Communications Inc. v. NLRB7 1 that
called the Board to task for its stilted approach to addressing the use of
vulgarity and racial epithets through the prism of the Clear Pine
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit; the decision in that Court was still pending at the time this Article
was submitted. See Brief Amicus Curiae of Equal Employment Advisory Council, 2016 WL
5122576 (Sept. 6, 2016); Brief for Intervenor Union, 2016 WL 6694581 (Nov. 9, 2016); Brief for the
NLRB, 2016 WL 6694582 (Nov. 10, 2016); Reply Brief for Petitioner/Cross Respondent, 2016 WL
7335072 (Dec. 9, 2016). While this Article was going through final edits, the Eighth Circuit issued
a decision affirming the decision of the NLRB. See Cooper Tire & Rubber Co, v. NLRB, 866 F.3d
885 (2017). A dissenting opinion to the 2 to 1 decision criticized the Board and the court majority's
deference to prior Board decisions while noting that "[n]o employer in America is or can be required
to employ a racial bigot." Id. at 894 (J. Beam, dissenting). The final resolution of this matter is
unclear as the Employer has petitioned for a rehearing en banc with the Eighth Circuit and further
decisions may arise. Also, with a new Republican president, Donald Trump, the make-up of the
NLRB is likely to change. The current sole Republican Member who was on the 2016 Obama Board
and did not participate in the Cooper Tire decision, Philip Miscimarra, is now the acting chairman
and will eventually become part of the NLRB's majority called upon to assess further application
of the ClearPine Mouldings doctrine.
' Samson, supra note 64.

101 F.3d 528, 530 (8th Cir. 1996), rev'g Nickell Moulding, 317 N.L.R.B. 826 (1995).
m Id.
69 560 F.3d 181 (4th Cir. 2009), denying enforcement, 351 N.L.R.B. 1324 (2007).
7o Id.
n 837 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2016).
67
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Mouldings standard.7 2 Specifically, Judge Millett first concluded in the
majority opinion that the employee's behavior of grabbing his crotch
and making an obscene gesture towards a female, non-striking employee was protected as part of "the rough-and-tumble nature of picket
lines."73 The court also noted that the Board had incorrectly limited its

analysis to whether the misconduct was violent instead of asking
whether the striking employee's misconduct may "reasonably tend to
coerce or intimidate" employees under the Clear Pine Mouldings requirement."4
In the concurring opinion, Judge Millett noted that her reasons for
writing a separate opinion were to "convey [her] substantial concern
with the too-often cavalier and enabling approach that the Board's decisions have taken toward the sexually and racially demeaning misconduct of some employees during strikes." 5 Judge Millett's evident frustration was based upon Board decisions she believed had "repeatedly
given refuge to conduct that is not only intolerable by any standard of
decency, but also illegal in every other corner of the workplace," including "sexually and racially disparaging conduct that Board decisions
have winked away."

6

From her perspective, the Board's analysis has

failed to address "the very types of demeaning and degrading messages
that for too much of our history have trapped women and minorities in
a second-class workplace status."" Although Judge Millett questions
several cases involving sexist statements, the "racially derogatory and
demeaning epithets and behavior" protected by the Airo Die Casting
and Cooper Tire decisions also fall within the specific ire trumpeted by
her concurring opinion."8 Judge Millett captures the overall concern of
this Article by asking "how on earth can calling an African-American
worker 'nigger' be a tolerated mode of communicating worker grievances?""9

Id. at 20-24 (Millett, J., concurring).
7 Id. at 12 (majority opinion). Judge Millett authored both the majority opinion and the concurring opinion in this case. See id. at 5-20 (majority opinion) and 20-24 (concurring opinion).
7
Id. at 18.
6 Id. at 20 (Millett, J., concurring).
6 Id. at 20-21.
77Id. at 21.
78 Id.
7 Id. at 22.
72
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Employee Outbursts: Atlantic Steel Protects Use of Harassing
Vulgarities

An employee engaged in protected activity under Section 7 of the
NLRA "can, by opprobrious conduct, lose the protection of the Act." 80
Under the Board's Atlantic Steel test, four factors must be weighed in
assessing whether an employee's speech is protected by the NLRA or is
instead subject to disciplinary action by the employer: "(1) the place of
the discussion; (2) the subject matter of the discussion; (3) the nature of
the employee's outburst; and (4) whether the outburst was, in any way,
provoked by an employer's unfair labor practice." 81 "The Atlantic Steel
standard attempts to balance the employer's interest in an orderly work
environment with the employee's right to engage in concerted activity." 82 However, under this standard, employees may use sarcasm along
with obnoxious language, including cursing and calling a supervisor unpleasant names. 83
The question of whether this protection of Section 7 activity under
the opprobrious standard comes at the expense of protections from harassment under Title VII has represented a longstanding concern. 84 In
1991, Professor Peter Millspaugh questioned whether Section 7 activity
under the NLRA should supersede protections under Title VII with respect to racial harassment in the workplace.8 5 Millspaugh discussed the
Board's 1988 Arthur Young & Co. decision where employees engaged in
concerted activity also made racial and ethnic slurs regarding blacks
and Puerto Ricans. 86 The administrative law judge found that the alleged racial slurs did not include those "typically offensive ways of describing blacks or Puerto Ricans."87
The administrative law judge in Arthur Young also noted that the
employer asserted that if it had not discharged the employees involved
for their use of racial slurs, the employer would have been subject to
potential liability under Title VII.88 Nevertheless, the administrative
" See Atl. Steel Co., 245 N.L.R.B. 814, 816 (1979).
81 Id.
82 Elizabeth Allen, Note, You Can't Say That on Facebook:
The NLRA's Opprobriousness
Standardand Social Media, 45 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 195, 207 (2014); see also Susan D. Carle,
Angry Employees: Revisiting Insubordinationin Title V17 Cases, 10 HARV. L. & POL'Y REV. 185,
218-21 (2016) (describing the Atlantic Steel doctrine).
83 Allen, supra note 82, at 207 (citing Board
decisions).
8
See Peter E. Millspaugh, When Self- OrganizationIncludes Racial Harassment: Must the
NLRA Yield to Title VII?, 2 GEO. MASON U. C.R. L.J. 1, 12-13 (1991).
Id. at 14.
8
8
See Arthur Young & Co., 291 N.L.R.B. 39, 44 (1988).
" Id. at 44 n.11.
8 Id. at 44 n.13.
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law judge rejected this argument by stating this "assertion goes far beyond what the facts in this case could conceivably justify" because an
"occasional ethnic slur" is not actionable as it does not reach the level
of "derogatory comments . . . so excessive and opprobrious as to constitute an unlawful practice under Title VII."89
This finding creates a dilemma for employers. Only comments that
are so severe and pervasive that they create hostile environment liability will be exempt from NLRB protection if made as part of concerted
activity. However, an employer's choice to do nothing when offensive
speech is conveyed could still create hostile environment liability under
Title VII. This inaction also sends a chilling and retaliatory message to
black employees that any protests to the use of racial slurs, when
couched with concerted activity, will be ignored by the employer. But, if
the employer takes disciplinary action, that discipline can represent an
unfair labor practice in coercing employees in the exercise of their Section 7 rights under the NLRA.
Although the Board's application of Atlantic Steel allows profane
comments, the Board has not clearly applied the Atlantic Steel factors
to protect the use of racial epithets. However, the Board's application of
Atlantic Steel does suggest broad acceptance of offensive speech as being protected by the NLRA. In its most recent application of the Atlantic
Steel test in 2014's Plaza Auto Center, Inc., 90 which came to the Board
on remand from the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, the Board was required to reapply the four-factor Atlantic Steel
test to determine whether an employee's outburst during protected activity caused the loss of protection under the Act. 91
The Board had to determine the nature of the outburst, whether it
involved obscene remarks that constituted insubordination, or whether
it was also menacing, physically aggressive, or belligerent. 92 The specific incident involved an employee who lost his temper after discussing
working conditions with his supervisor, calling the supervisor a "'fucking mother fucking,' a 'fucking crook,' and an 'asshole' who was stupid
as "nobody liked him and, everyone talked about him behind his back." 9 3
The Board held that the employee did not engage in menacing, physically aggressive, or belligerent conduct and as a result his speech was

9 Id.
9o 360 N.L.R.B. 972, 979 (2014) (holding that the employee retained the protection of the
Act
despite his outburst as the Act protects his right to engage in Section 7 activity without unduly
impairing the employer's legitimate interest in maintaining order and discipline in the workplace).
ex Id. at 972.
9

Id. at 974.

9 Id.
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considered protected Section 7 activity. 94 In a dissenting opinion, Member Harry Johnson argued: "The holding here that a profane, sustained,
ad hominem attack on a senior manager in the work force must be tolerated because of the connection to Section 7 activity unnecessarily impedes employers' ability to deal with such conduct if engaged in by one
worker against another." 95
In another decision, Pier Sixty, LLC, 96 an employee, upset with his
supervisor about how the supervisor addressed him during an organizing campaign, used his iPhone during a break to post the following comment about his supervisor on Facebook: "Bob is such a NASTY
MOTHER FUCKER don't know how to talk to people!!!!!! Fuck his
mother and his entire fucking family!!!! What a LOSER!!!! Vote YES for
the UNION!!!!!!!" 9 The Board found that this statement was protected
Section 7 activity as the opprobriousness of the statement did not outweigh the other factors involved, including the employer's anti-union
hostility, the provocation and impulse of the employee, the subject matter, the limiting of the communication to the employee's Facebook
friends, the nature of the post, the use of similar language by the employer, and the lack of a policy that prohibits such language.9 8
Again, Member Johnson wrote a rather passionate dissent in which
he especially criticized the language the employee used attacking his
supervisor's family and the Board's allowance of such.99 Member Johnson first stated that under the totality of the circumstances it was quite
appropriate for Pier Sixty to discipline the employee, Perez.100 He then
stated:
In condoning Perez' offensive online rant, which was fraught
with insulting and obscene vulgarities directed toward his manager and his manager's mother and family, my colleagues recast
an outrageous, individualized griping episode as protected activity. I cannot join in concluding that such blatantly uncivil and
opprobrious behavior is within the Act's protection. 101

Id.
9 Id. at 982 (Member Johnson, dissenting) (citing Kerri Lynn Stone, Floor to Ceiling: How
Setbacks and Challenges to the Anti-Bullying Movement Pose Challenges to Employers Who Wish
to Ban Bullying, 22 TEMP. POL. & C.R. L. REv. 355 (2013)).
9 362 N.L.R.B. No. 59, 2015 WL 1457688 (Mar. 31, 2015).
" Id. at *2.
98 Id. at
*5.
94

* Id. at *5 (Member Johnson, dissenting).
'
362 N.L.R.B. No. 59, 2015 WL 1457688, at *5 (Mar. 31, 2015).
101 Id.
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Member Johnson argued that Perez's statements were, in fact,
"qualitatively different" than statements other employees had used and
were tolerated by Pier Sixty. 10 2 According to Member Johnson, the comments directed at the supervisor's family were "over the top" and were
not deserving of the Act's protection. 103 The comments were "personally
offensive" and were broadcast to a much broader audience than employees cursing at one another in the workplace. 10 4
On the other side of the equation are cases that have started to
suggest that employee misconduct involving offensive statements may
result in unprotected conduct despite the Atlantic Steel factors. For example, in Fresenius USA Manufacturing, Inc.,105 the Board revisited a
prior case that had been overturned due to a lack of the proper number
of Board members. 106 The prior 2012 decision in Freseniusi0 7 held that
the employee's improper and vulgar behavior in using the word "pussy"
during the course of otherwise concerted activity was protected.108 Specifically, the employee anonymously wrote statements on union newsletters left in the employee breakroom in an attempt to support the union during a decertification election including stating "'Dear Pussies,
Please Read!""1 09 The Board found that he did not forfeit the NLRA protection despite a sexual harassment complaint. 110 In revisiting the 2012
decision with a properly constituted number of Board members in 2015,
the Board, without disavowing the earlier finding that the employee's
handwritten remarks were protected, noted the importance of the employer's Title VII interest in investigating the conduct and reached a
different result from its prior decision.11 1 Ultimately the Board sustained the employer's discharge of the employee because the employee
had lied during the course of the employer's investigation. 11 2

102
103
104

Id.
Id.
Id.

362 N.L.R.B. No. 130, 2015 WL 3932160 (June 24, 2015).
Id. at *2-3.
107 Fresenius USA Mfg. Inc., 358 N.L.R.B. 1261 (2012) (applying the Atlantic Steel factors to
assess whether an employee's conduct should be protected after female employees objected to the
language pursuant to Title VII; however, the decision involved recess appointment Board members
who were eventually found to be unconstitutionally appointed), vacated and remanded, No. 121387 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
o Id. at 1266.
1
Id. at 1261, 1265.
`0 Id. at 1266, 1267-68.
111 362 N.L.R.B. No. 130, 2015 WL 3932160, at *2-3.
112 id.
10

106
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III. ACCOMMODATING EMPLOYER REGULATION OF RACIST SPEECH
THROUGH TITLE VII RETALIATION AND CIVILITY ANALYSIS IN FUTURE
NLRB DECISIONS

To the extent the Board continues to address racist statements
made by employees in the workplace, it must acknowledge the important policy reasons why employers must be allowed to take disciplinary action when such statements occur. Under the Board's current
analysis, an employee can say almost anything without punishment. 113
Employers have obligations under Title VII to respond to racist statements by employees as mechanism to prevent liability for racial harassment. 114 However, a "'mere utterance of an . . epithet which engenders
offensive feelings . . . ' does not sufficiently affect the conditions of employment to implicate Title VII."115 But an employer may be liable for

harassment under Title VII "if it knew or should have known about the
conduct and failed to stop it" as it reached the level of being severe and
pervasive to establish a hostile environment.1 1 6 As a result, employers
are faced with the Hobson's choice of being found liable under Title VII
for failing to address racist statements in the workplace versus being
found liable for unfair labor practices when taking action against an
employee for racist statements found to be protected under the NLRA.
Strong policy reasons pursuant to Section 7 of the NLRA and its
protection of concerted activity by employees may suggest some support
for protecting speech uttered in the workplace even if it is offensive. In
an adversarial setting where emotions and passions reach a fever pitch,
the Board has found that it is better to err on the side of protecting
workers who may impulsively and roughly say bad language to replacement workers or their supervisors.1 1 7 Certainly, opportunistic employers, ready to violate the NLRA by terminating employees for exercising
Section 7 rights, may rush to judgment regarding the assessment of discipline for impulsive comments made in the heat of the moment and
"' This inappropriate and narrowing approach of only considering whether the speech is a
threat is not limited to just racist speech. See Wayne Stead Cadillac, 303 N.L.R.B. 432, 436 (1991)
(administrative law judge finding a striking employee's statements were protected when the employee grabbed his testicles and gyrated his hips back and forth while yelling "fuck you" towards
a nonemployee and the nonemployee's 8-year-old daughter who were in their car attempting to
leave the employer's premises).
114 See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807 (1998) (describing how an employer
may have a defense to a harassment claim by establishing "that the employer exercised reasonable
care to prevent and correct promptly any ...

harassing behavior").

"' Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993) (quoting Meritor Say. Bank, FSB, v.
Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986)). Also, '"simple teasing' [or] offhand comments" do not establish a
claim of harassment under Title VII. See Faragher,524 U.S. at 788.
116 See Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 759 (1998).
117 See Allied Indus. Workers Local 289, 476 F.2d 868, 879
(D.C. Cir. 1972).
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part of the "rough-and-tumble" environment that the Board accepts by
its policies aimed at protecting legitimate Section 7 activity.1 18 The
Board, in its expertise, has weighed this balance in favor of allowing
offensive speech for employees in the heat of the moment as long as the
comments do not rise to the level of being threatening or physical.11 9
In identifying the policy reasons for allowing such offensive speech
when compared with the policy reasons for banning harassment, bullying, and unproductive workplace speech, there are both legal and pragmatic considerations for employers and employees offended by such
speech. 120 However, as Professor Dianne Avery had noted back in 1993,
protection of certain offensive language by the NLRB seems to condone
as appropriate an anachronistic form of workplace "behavior in the
'rough and tumble' of labor activity." 21 At this stage in the development
of workplace law and legitimate employer concerns regarding the prevention of harassment and bullying based upon offensive language being used, the time has come for the NLRB to consider the burdens on
employers who must respond when faced with evidence of racist comments being aimed at employees. Furthermore, the Board must shift its
focus to the employees subjected to the racist comments and the effect
on their ability to exercise their Section 7 rights in light of the language
being allowed by the Board as being protected.
While acknowledging that the Board cannot justify its analysis in
allowing striking employees the protection to signal to other employees
that racist statements are necessary to convey their concerns while on
the picket line, Judge Millett's concurring opinion in ConsolidatedCommunications offers two suggestions that should be considered by the
Board before it decides to continue its protection of racist speech. First,
the opinion notes that the Board's analysis appears to focus on the perspective of the perpetrator rather than the victim when assessing
whether the statements made are a threat or coercive. 122 Second, the
opinion highlights the Board's failure to consider how the racist statements may have an effect beyond the picket line when a black employee
"has seen the darkest thoughts of a co-worker revealed in a deliberately

11
See Consolidated Communications, 837 F.3d 1, 12 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (citing Allied, 476 F.2d
at 879).
" See Briar Crest Nursing Home, 333 N.L.R.B. 935, 947 (2001).
120 See Cynthia L. Estlund, Freedom of Expression in the Workplace and the Problem of Discriminatory Harassment, 75 TEX. L. REV. 687, 753-59 (1997).
121 See Dianne Avery, Gender Stereotypes, Picket Line Violence, and the "Law" of Strike Misconduct Cases, 8 OHIO ST. J. ONDISP. RESOL. 251, 274 (1993).
122 837 F.3d at 23 (Millett,
J., concurring).
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humiliating tirade" and may not "feel truly equal or safe working alongside that employee again." 1 2 3
Some "[r]esearch studies show that workplace morale, as well as
individual employees' psyche, productivity, and mental health, are all
threatened by abusive, discriminatory workplace speech."1 24 Black employees-more than any other racial or ethnic group-are likely to experience frequent discrimination and report symptoms of depression as
a result of that discrimination.1 2 5 Also, Professor Kerry Stone has explained: "when group members . . . have their complaints ignored, this
disregard may be read as corporate ratification of the unlawful behavior." 1 2 6 As a result, employers have a strong justification to change the
analysis that leaves them helpless to respond when employees have uttered racist, sexist, and vulgar statements with impunity based on protection under the NLRA.
At a minimum, and without making a major change, the Board
should reverse its Airo Die Casting and Cooper Tire decisions. Then the
Board should also consider the thoughtful concerns of Members
Schaumber and Kirsanow expressed in Airo Die Castingregarding how
the use of the N-word could result in loss of protection under the NLRA
even without the presence of a threat or violence.1 27 To that end, the
Board should view racist statements by employees similar to the statements in Airo Die Casting and Cooper Tire as having a tendency to coerce fellow black employees in the exercise of their Section 7 rights. This
is not a huge step for the NLRB, which considers inflammatory appeals
based upon race during an election campaign to be improper. 128
Instead of looking like a federal agency that is willing to protect
racist speech, the Board should start with the premise that racist
speech does not receive protection under the NLRA as concerted activity.1 2 9 However, when looking at the disciplinary action taken in re-

123
124

Id. at 24.

12

id.

Kerri Lynn Stone, Decoding Civility, 28 BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 185, 213
(2013).

126 Id. at 221.
127 347 N.L.R.B. 810, 810 n.1 (2006) (noting "there may
well be circumstances ... in which a
picketing employee's use of the word 'nigger' might cause the employee to lose the Act's protection,
even in the absence of violence or explicit threats of violence").
'8 See Sewell Manufacturing Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 66, 71-72 (1962) (identifying election campaign
appeals to racial prejudice that are not germane are inappropriate and finding that such appeals
warrant setting aside any NLRB election results).
1
This Article recognizes that the political and partisan nature of the NLRB could help a
newly-constituted Republican Board in pursuing the changes suggested herein to overrule Airo
Die Castingbased on the opinions of the Republican NLRB members in that case. See Green, supra
note 17, at 1644 (describing how the NLRB's analysis has been criticized as political in that it
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sponse to this racist speech, the employer must not act in a discriminatory manner by taking harsher actions for those employees also involved in Section 7 activity. As in Cooper Tire, if other employees involved in much more drastic behavior received lesser sanctions, or no
sanctions, when compared with the employees involved in uttering the
racist speech, then this discriminatory treatment under the NLRA may
protect those employees despite their racist comments.
Without having to reach the legal standard of actionable harassment, employers should have the right to regulate employee speech that
involves the utterance of racially-charged language. Because utterance
of racial epithets in the workplace requires severe and pervasive situations to foster a hostile environment, Title VII may not adequately address basic issues before they reach that level. Nevertheless, basic notions of civility and prevention of bullying and harassment in the
workplace as a tool for productivity and sufficiency represent legitimate
reasons for an employer's disciplinary actions. 130 Title VII cases consistently state that antidiscrimination law does not operate as a civility
code "designed to rid the workplace of vulgarity." 1 1 However, basic incivility creates a major financial problem for employers. Christine Porath and Christine Pearson have documented the significant financial
costs that employers undertake as a result of incivility:
The costs chip away at the bottom line. Nearly everybody who
experiences workplace incivility responds in a negative way, in
some cases overtly retaliating. Employees are less creative when
they feel disrespected, and many get fed up and leave. About half
deliberately decrease their effort or lower the quality of their

changes "from one administration to the next"). Also, the prospect of seeking a legislative resolution to address racist speech through changes to the NLRA is unlikely as repeated attempts to
amend that statute in Congress have primarily failed for more than forty years. Id. at 1625 n.9
(describing the difficulty in obtaining legislative reform regarding the NLRA) (citing Richard D.
Kahlenberg & Moshe Z. Marvit, 'Architects of Democracy": Labor Organizing as a Civil Right, 9
STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 213, 221-29, 231-36 (2013)).
'm See Stone, supra note 124, at 223-26.
'31 See Lyle v. Warner Bros. Television Prods., 38 Cal. 4th 264, 295 (2006). Although outside
the scope of this Article, there are some situations where employees may use racist speech, including the N-word, when it is not directed at a particular employee and the context may suggest that
the employee who uttered those words was not appreciating the racial implications of the speech.
See Eisenstadt, supra note 2, at 314 (arguing that 'linguistic meaning, particularly of derogatory
terms, is a complex phenomenon that results from a multitude of contextual factors . . . [and]
include time, place, identity of the parties, and tone of voice"). Professor Leora Eisenstadt has
raised this concern and suggested that the racial identity of the speaker as an outsider or insider
of the racial group at issue should be considered in some context-possibly through expert testimony to help a jury understand the use of certain speech deemed racist and how an employer
should respond to it. Id. at 306, 335-42. Eisenstadt also notes that there are weaknesses in her
suggestion including potential inconsistency. Id. at 348.
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work. And incivility damages customer relationships. Our research shows that people are less likely to buy from a company
with an employee they perceive as rude, whether the rudeness
is directed at them or at other employees. Witnessing just a single unpleasant interaction leads customers to generalize about
other employees, the organization, and even the brand.

. .

. And

we've collected data from more than 14,000 people throughout
the United States and Canada in order to track the prevalence,
types, causes, costs, and cures of incivility at work. We know two
things for certain: Incivility is expensive, and few organizations
recognize or take action to curtail it.13 2
As the Pickeringtest under First Amendment jurisprudence clearly
establishes, employers should be able to regulate worker speech
through disciplinary action aimed at an employer's need to promote the
efficiency of its services, which outweighs the employee's speech interests. 133 When looking at the overall efficiencies and costs related to incivility in the workplace, an employer has a strong, compelling interest
to take disciplinary action based on racist speech that is independent of
but in conjunction with any desire to comply with Title VII's anti-harassment laws.
Because the failure to respond to racist statements can deter a reasonable employee from opposing racist practices, 134 the Board should
also take into account Title VII's broad standard regarding retaliation
and how acquiescence to harassing statements can create retaliation
liability for employers. The Supreme Court broadened the scope of Title
VII's anti-retaliation provision by noting that the claim covers a "materially adverse" action which includes any action that might have "dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination."13 5
Certainly, black employees will be subjected to materially adverse
action when employers, faced with evidence of racist statements towards black employees, must still let those statements go without any

132 See Christine Porath & Christine Pearson, The Price of Incivility, HARv. Bus. REV. (Jan.Feb. 2013), https:/fhbr.org/2013/01/the-price-of-incivility/ar/1 [https://perma.cc/B55X-WNUA].
133 See Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568; see also Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 674 (1994) (plurality opinion discussing public employer's interest in efficiency as the basis to outweigh an employee's First Amendment interest); Connick, 461 U.S. at 154 (describing the same balance of concerns and allowing employer concerns in addressing key services that the government provides
the public).
134 Deborah L. Brake, Retaliation, 90 MINN. L. REV. 18, 35 (2005).
'35 Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 68 (2006) (citing Rochon v. Gonzales, 438 F.3d 1211, 1219 (D.C. Cir. 2006)).
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disciplinary action due to the NLRB's analysis which finds that the racist statements are protected. There are many cases under Title VII
where black employees have complained about the use of racist speech
and epithets.1 36 One commentator has even asserted that an isolated,
single racist statement involving the N-word should create hostile environment liability for an employer.1 37
Other cases suggest that an employer's failure to respond to an isolated, single racist comment may create retaliation liability for an employer under Title VII. In Boyer-Liberto v. FontainebleauCorp.,138 the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit found that a black
employee who had complained about a single, racially derogatory comment was able to establish a retaliation claim.1 39 The court reversed a
prior decision holding that an employee could not bring a claim for retaliation by opposing an isolated comment since that comment did not
rise to the level of a severe and pervasive act required for actionable
harassment under Title VII140 The court noted that if it applied this
single comment analysis, it would deter reasonable employees from
speaking up and deprive them of the right to pursue a retaliation
claim.141 Also, in Rivera v. Rochester Genesee Regional Transportation
Authority,142 the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
found that a supervisor's reaction to an employee's complaint about coworkers' racial slurs, in telling the employee to suck it up and get over
it, was a material adverse action with respect to a retaliation claim. As
a result, the court noted that 'unchecked retaliatory co-worker harassment"' can establish a material adverse action warranting a retaliation
claim against an employer.1 4 3

136 See, e.g., Fisher v. Lufkin Indus. Inc., 847 F.3d 752 (5th Cir.
2017); Douglas v. J.C. Penney,

474 F.3d 10 (1st Cir. 2007); Ayissi-Etoh v. Fannie Mae, 712 F.3d 572 (D.C. Cir. 2013).
137 See Darryll M. Halcomb Lewis, The Creationof a Hostile Work Environment by a Workplace
Supervisor's Single Use of the Epithet "Nigger", 53 AM. Bus. L. J. 383, 384 (2016) (arguing that the
single use of the epithet is such an '"extremely serious incident"' that it should be sufficient to
establish a hostile environment claim).
'3 786 F.3d 264, 281 (4th Cir. 2015)
139 Id. at 284.

140 Id. at 274-75.

Id. at 283; see also Tristin K. Green, Racial Emotion in the Workplace, 86 S. CAL.
L. REV.
959, 1019 (2013) (discussing how retaliation analysis must allow employees to oppose practices
that may not rise to the clear level of actionable harassment as a tool to encourage prophylactic
measures).
142 743 F.3d 11, 26 (2d Cir.
2014).
141

143 id.
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CONCLUSION: THE NLRB SHOULD NOT TOLERATE RACIST
WORKPLACE SPEECH

Now let's return to the discussion among the two employees at the
beginning of this Article. The second employee's statement was:
[NJothing will be gained from mentioning Black Lives Matter in
this union organizing campaign. Black Lives Matter just represents a crusade to address what happened to a bunch of N-word
criminals who deserved what they got. All lives matter.. .. [S]top
being distracted by issues of race and focus on the only division
that matters in the workplace: class.
The rationale of allowing rough-and-tumble activity in the heat of the
moment as supporting concerted activity under Section 7 of the NLRA
when on the picket line or as a result of an angry outburst towards a
supervisor does not appear to fit well with this comment. The second
employee's decision to use the N-word does not seem to have any real
relationship to the concerted activity of discussing the selection of a union. But even if the use of the N-word is considered to be part and parcel
of the overall comments about selecting a union as concerted activity,
the employer has a strong interest in regulating this speech as a result
of the potential problems created for black employees by failing to regulate racist comments in the workplace.
Although an employer must send a message to stop racist utterances before they reach the level of being severe and pervasive to create
a racially hostile environment in violation of Title VII, the need for this
regulation is not based upon actual compliance with Title VII, per se,
as usually a single utterance is insufficient to establish liability. Nevertheless, NLRB actions should not easily supersede an employer's efforts
to prevent a hostile environment from arising and subjecting that employer to Title VII liability. Further, the regulation of these comments
is also necessary because of the tremendous costs to the employer's efficient operation by having incivility and bullying permeate the workplace through the use of racial epithets and other racist statements.
Employees, who are pursuing their Section 7 rights, should not receive
protection from the NLRA when using racist speech to effectuate those
rights. Nor should the NLRB enforce the NLRA in a manner that seems
to condone the use of racist speech. Under the analysis established in
this Article, employees with legitimate Section 7 concerns can still seek
protection for their racist statements when the facts indicate that the
employer has chosen to take disciplinary action based on the racist
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statements merely as a pretext to disciplining employees because of
their concerted activity. 1 44
The toxic incivility created by allowing employees who utter such
racist statements to be defended as a matter of right under the NLRA
also becomes the impetus for the employer's disciplinary and regulatory
action related to that speech. Title VII's broad protection for retaliatory
employer actions that would deter a reasonable person from pursuing a
claim suggests that the NLRB's application of doctrines that result in
an employer's inability to respond to racist speech should not be allowed
absent proof of pretext. Otherwise, a message will be sent to black employees that it is useless for them to protest racist speech in the workplace out of fear that the NLRB will find the speech protected. By removing these doctrines that seem to condone racist workplace speech,
employee productivity and efficiency in the workplace will increase as
employees can focus on their jobs without being weighed down by uncivil colleagues who bully and harass through racist statements.
We no longer operate in the rough-and-tumble times when the
NLRB had the audacity to adopt certain doctrines (under its responsibilities to enforce the NLRA) that protect racist speech and the utterance of racial epithets either made on the picket line, in an outburst to
a supervisor, or in any other manner. With the growing diversity of the
workplace and the legal and moral responsibility that employers have
to protect black employees from racial harassment, those rough-andtumble doctrines should no longer be a viable part of the Board's analysis. The current heightened environment regarding protests of racist
treatment in our society exhibited by the Black Lives Matter movement
can only be exacerbated by having a federal agency, charged with protecting workers' rights, engaged in condoning the use of racist statements in the workplace.
Employees who are involved in Section 7 activity under the NLRA
should be sent the message that regardless of the context, racist utterances will not be tolerated. The only saving grace for such racist statements under the NLRA is when the employer takes disciplinary action
allegedly because of the statements as merely a pretext to its real motivation of chilling Section 7 activity. A racist statement or utterance of
a racial epithet should not have to rise to the level of being a threat or
involve a physical act for it to be considered unprotected under the
NLRA for coercing black workers in the exercise of their Section 7

'
See Domsey Trading Corp., 310 N.L.R.B. 777, 778 (1993) (finding that employers may not
tolerate behavior by non-strikers or replacements but seek to discipline strikers for such behavior);
Ozburn-Hessey Logistics, LLC., 359 N.L.R.B. 1025 (2013) (finding discriminatory application of
discipline based on use of racial epithets).
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rights. Employers, unions, employees, and those who care about issues
of racism in the workplace in this Black Lives Matter climate will all
benefit from having the NLRB change its analysis to recognize that racist statements and utterances of racial epithets should not receive broad
protection under the NLRA.

